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In this article we extend the agent-based model of firms’ formation and growth 
proposed in [4]. In [4] the firms‘  creation, expansion or contraction results from the 
interaction of heterogeneous utility maximizers. While the original model was able 
to replicate the power law distribution in the firms’ sizes agents in the model set 
their utility maximizing effort levels completely freely and undetected. This led to 
the emergence of free riding and influenced the overall dynamics of the model. 
Therefore we decided to extend the original model by introducing the monitoring 
which is seen in the economic literature, besides for example the proper incentive 
scheme ([18]), as a possible  way how to make employees work harder. Our 
motivation is to compare the extended model with both to the original case without 
monitoring and empirical data about firms‘  sizes distribution. 
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Since pioneering work of Gibrat ([15]) economists have been continuously interested
in the analysis of how ¯rms form and grow and what is the long run distribution of
¯rms' sizes. Recent empirical ¯ndings showed that like many natural and social pat-
terns (e.g. earthquake magnitudes, sizes of cities, word occurrences, etc.) and also
other economic variables (e.g. income and wealth distribution, stock market returns
and trading volumes) the ¯rms' sizes in various countries behave according to power
law ([25]). The existence of power law in economic data has an important practi-
cal implications both for the risk control and management ([31]) and policy makers
([14]). It thus seems interesting from the economist's point of view to understand
how such patterns arise and persist in the economy.
Many previously proposed models that addressed this topic took the form of
simple statistical models based on the modi¯cations of the so-called Gibrat law1
(e.g. [29], [20], [23]). Despite the fact that these models were relatively successful
in generating power-laws they provided little insights of how the power-laws emerge
from the interaction of economic agents (e.g. entrepreneurs, employees, managers
etc.).
To answer this question we follow a di®erent approach. In this article we extend
the agent-based model of ¯rms' formation and growth proposed in [4]. In [4] the
¯rms creation, expansion or contraction results from the interaction of heterogeneous
utility maximizers. While the original model was able to replicate the power law
distribution in the ¯rms' sizes but agents in the model set their utility maximizing
e®ort levels completely freely and undetected. This led to the emergence of free
riding and in°uenced the overall dynamics of the model. Therefore, we would like
to extend the original model by introducing the monitoring which is seen in the
economic literature, besides for example the proper incentive scheme ([18]), as a
possible way how to make employees work harder. Our motivation is to compare
the extended model with both the original case without monitoring and empirical
data about ¯rms sizes distribution.
Workers can be monitored in many di®erent ways: by co-workers ([8]), by the
owner of the ¯rm ([1]) or hired supervisor ([6]). Here we introduce a very simple
ad-hoc monitoring mechanism which uses central authority personi¯ed by the boss
of the ¯rm who monitors and eventually punishes workers. The aim of this work
is to introduce and implement a relatively simple initial model not very distant
from reality, for which the outcomes might be easily analyzed and thus the e®ect of
monitoring on the process of ¯rms' formation and growth examined. We also treat
it as a ¯rst attempt in this direction and use it as a basis for the future research.
There exists a rich economic literature that considers di®erent aspects of mon-
itoring that are omitted here. For example for the insightful discussion of the mo-
tivation for the monitoring in ¯rms we would like to refer interested reader to [1],
[6] or [8]. We also simplify our analysis a lot by not considering barriers and costs
of monitoring which are discussed for example in [17], [30] and [32] and leave such
1Gibrat law states that if the growth rates of ¯rms in a ¯xed population (i.e. with no entry and
exit) are uncorrelated and independent of size, the resulting distribution of ¯rms sizes is lognormal
([15])features for future work.
The structure of the article is following. After a brief introductory explanation
of power law (chapter 2.1.) and agent-based modeling (2.2.) an already existing
model being extended herein is presented (2.3.). To extend the model two di®er-
ent monitoring mechanisms of the individuals' e®ort levels are described and fully
implemented (3.). Finally, obtained results are statistically analyzed (4.).section 5.
concludes.
2. Used framework
2.1. Power law and company size distributions
Since the birth of modern statistics, scientists have introduced plenty of more or
less known probability distribution types. While some of them are useful mainly
in theory (e.g. chi-squared, F-distribution), others are to various extents being ob-
served in the real world environment as well (e.g. uniform, exponential, normal,
lognormal). This article concerns a (at least for an average student) less known
probability distribution type { Power law, also known as Scaling Law, Pareto distri-
bution or Zipf's law. We will not go into details di®ering the terms and will simply
consider them identical.
A quantity x is said to follow a power law, when "the probability of measuring
a particular value of the quantity varies inversely as a power of that value"([25], 1),
in other words where the probability density/mass function of the quantity x can
be written as follows:
p(x) = Cx
¡® (1)
where ® is an exponent characterizing the power law. For (1) to be a density/mass
function, ® > 1. The value of C is then given by ®2. Besides being right skewed,
the power law distributions do have a notable feature of linearity in log-log scales3,
where ® represents the negative slope.
Furthermore, there is a fascinating empirical evidence of observing such relations
in surprisingly many real phenomena, e.g. in word frequencies, intensities of wars,
populations of the cities, aspects of the Internet tra±c, diameters of earthquakes4,
etc. ([5], 2;[25], 5) Knowledge of such a fact can become a very practical information,
for instance for predictions5. Signi¯cant for our work is that even the companies'
sizes distribution seems to follow a power law ([5],[25],[26],[28]). In this case, it is
2For the area beyond the p(x) curve to be equal to 1; see normalization in [25], page 9 and in
[12], page 2.
3Could be easily seen after taking a logarithm of both sides of the equation (1) : logp(x) =
logC ¡ ®logx
4For instance, an empirical evidence for Zipf's law says that the occurrence of words used in
a natural language (especially English) follows p(n) = n¡®, where n is the rank of a word in the
language with 1 being the most used word.
5Zipf's law in the word frequencies could be used in an optimal data structures design in







where x0 (minimal company size, usually 1) is a constant and x > x0 is a random
variable of company size.
Studies vary in estimated value of ®. On the data for 1997 from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Axtell ([5]) estimates ® as 2.059 if size de¯ned by number of employees and
1.994 if by receipts. In ([4], 41) he uses another reported values of 2:23 for US and
2:11 for UK of Simon and Ijiri and con¯rms that it is not signi¯cant which of the
two de¯nitions is applied. Ramsden ([28]) successfully estimates the power value
parameter of a similar simple canonical law for 20 countries and tries to explain
the di®erent results by a \temperature of the economy"7. Kaizoji ([19]) adds that
there is no universality in the size distributions of ¯rms. Nevertheless, power law
distributions in company sizes are really generally observed, with di®erent ® for






















































Figure 1: US Companies sizes for 2005 in normal and log-log scales following the
powerlaw. Source of data: US Census Bureau([ 35])
For illustration purposes, the ¯gure 1 displays a histogram of company sizes
frequencies across the US economy of 2005. Data were taken from the US Census
Bureau ([ 35]) in a form of counts of the companies in few categories. Despite the
need of relying on a much softer set of data and proper methods, an estimation of
® by OLS (similar to the one Axtell did in [5]) was applied. If the histogram is
redrawn in logarithmical scales (on the righthand side of the ¯gure), some linearity
could be roughly really observed (and OLS gives ® = 1:87). Such conclusions might
however be spurious9 and should be thus based on statistical methods with more
6As C is given by the normalization, it has been omitted.
7P¶ erez, Brown and Tun ([26]) receive similar results for a group of less developed countries.
8Clauset, Shalizi and Newman showed, that due to not using rigorous methods, sometimes "the
power-law hypothesis is found to be incompatible with the observed data" ([12]). The results must
therefore be taken with caution.
9One should really not take similar results seriously. Data used is actually only few numbers,
while needed would be precise sizes of representative companies samples. In addition, the method
of ordinary least squares does not take into account the normalization condition and estimates are
"subject to systematic and potentially large errors"([12], 22).accurate data only10.
Observing a behavior is clearly vital, yet the search for its causes is even more
important. In some probability distribution types, the occurrence is unambiguously
explained by the distribution's character (e.g. uniform), or using the theoretical
concepts (e.g. central limit theorem for normal distributions). In power law dis-
tributions, ¯nding the causes is however not so clear. This paper looks for the
roots of the observed power law in company sizes by a relatively new technique of
agent-based computational modeling. For sake of completeness, let us remind that
\there exists a body of stochastic process models in which random draws from a
symmetric distribution of growth rates yield distributions of ¯rm sizes that are right
skewed, following a Pareto distribution"([4]). This approach to explain the power
law is based on so-called Gibrat's law saying that once growth rates and sizes are
independent, company sizes distribution is right skewed. Growiec et al. present an
econophysical model of proportional growth of ¯rms, where ¯rms embody products
which grow proportionally to their count and sizes and so do the companies ([16]).
Distribution of ¯rm sizes follows power law in upper tails11. Another explanations
might be also found (see for instance [25], page 12). Despite all those being rele-
vant, the following sections will be looking only for an agent-based way to examine
observed behavior.
2.2. Agent-based computational modeling
Economy is an unthinkably complicated and dynamic system. Models describing its
rules, (ir)regularities, patterns have to deal with it. To explain even a partial process,
complex, well-de¯ned but cumbersome frameworks are often needed, though lighter
solutions might be formed when seen the problem from the \bottom up" perspective.
Plenty of global regularities arise from local interactions. Focusing on the \local"
level of a general behavior with the support of the current computational power it is
possible to let a complex system emerge from a plain set of given rules in a simulation.
This articles's main methodology allowing such \bottom up" construction is called
Agent-based computational economics (or modeling) (ACE).
The key term in ACE is agent. Agents could be practically anything - individ-
uals (such as consumers), institutions (companies, states), physical entities or even
strategies - generally any interactive unit. Usually, agents are meant to be inde-
pendent, boundedly rational, heterogeneous, autonomous and interacting with little
or no central authority ([24], 4) - notions not often present in traditional methods.
Characteristics may vary12, however they de¯ne the environment and rules in which
the agents \live" and form a complex organism representing the complicated model
studied.
10In the following sections a more reliable method built on the maximum likelihood estimation
by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman ([12]) will be used (Appendix A). Besides ®, it estimates the
lower bound for power law behavior x0 and can statistically say if the data indeed ¯t a power
law distribution (conclusions based on displaying a graph in log-log scale only could easily be
deceptive; the statistical test the authors introduced uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-¯t
test). Finally, thanks to a computer generation of sizes a trustworthy data set will be examined.
11Almost the same group of authors similarly con¯rms that growth rates display heavy tails
([9]).
12Adaptation, backward learning, social networks for instance may be relevant too.A common approach for simulating agents' life is to create an initial set of agents
and then to process in steps. In each step a (randomly or deterministically) selected
subset of agents is revived. Based on the de¯ned rules agents then look around,
evaluate their environment (i.e. fellow agents) and perform the de¯ned tasks. Con-
tinuously, or after a certain number of periods their characteristics are gathered and
examined. The initial parameters are commonly altered and the organism rerun.
Analyzing the gained information, the entire system is studied. An agent-based
model thus works simply as an a®ordable \economic laboratory" ([4]), where any
situation could be simulated13.
The ACE laboratories are constructed cheaply using programming languages.
Despite the possibility to implement it procedurally, an elegant way is to make use
of the object-oriented languages (such as Java, C++ or C#). Apart from other
advantages, object oriented programming allows programmers to formulate code
with a better resemblance of reality and suits the needs of ACE14. Based on the
requirements, di®erent techniques, such as genetic programming15 may be applied,
although similarly to the agent model as such, the implementation is purely up to
the scientist and can vary from a model to another.
This section is not to be taken exhaustively. An agent-based model in its core
is simply just a program to simulate a certain economic system and can thus be
understood in many ways. Its main strength is that it may overcome the cum-
bersomeness of robust but complicated mathematical models, while still allowing to
study very complex and dynamic systems with no or little "heroic assumptions". No
assumption of rationality, continuity, aggregation, homogeneity of agents, equilib-
ria reaching ([4], 90) is required, which results in producing more realistic theories.
On the other hand, ACE models do not produce ultimate explanations, since these
are hidden within agents con¯gurations ([4], 89). It ought not to be considered a
supplement, but rather a complement of other techniques ([33], 30).
A broad spectrum of di®erent examples, where ACE is helpful could be presented.
A famous example is the arti¯cial stock market created at the Santa Fe Institute
([22]). Cournot oligopoly might be studied ([2]), business process could be modeled
([7]), etc. Agent based approach is in fact far more general, and economy is just
one of the possible usages, so many other more or less practical simulations might
be run16.
Despite the existence of numerous fascinating examples, this article concerns
exclusively the topic of the companies' sizes generation. Agent-based models might
o®er di®erent perspectives to the problematics studied once purely mathematically
13Described skeleton does not have to hold everywhere. The \life" or the data retrieval can
even be understood entirely di®erently and still be modeling the system. The purpose of this
introduction is just to outline the main properties.
14Concretely, the notion of objects and classes in this technique almost perfectly ¯ts the notion
of agents in ACE. A class de¯nes agents by variables and methods resembling the parameters and
rules of the agents, one object instance separately represents one agent, etc.
15In some agent-based models agents (when for instance representing strategies) are allowed to
alter their selves by selections, mutations or recombination (e.g. in [2]).
16Imagine a public transport studied o® the streets, analysis of logistic design patterns, dis-
tributed computing, workforce or portfolio management, etc. Even a quaint example similar to
the article's topic of the size of wars generation exists ([10]).(as in already mentioned [16]). A spatial one-dimensional approach was introduced
by Kuscsik and Horv¶ ath ([21]). Companies are randomly placed in the market area
and have their own radii representing their sizes. The radii grow proportionally to
their value, however so-called negative feedback takes place when they intersect,
causing the ¯rms to shrink. Power law distribution with ® = 2:02 is under some
circumstances yielded.
In the followingsections, another ACE power law model is described ([4]) and
its modi¯cation then proposed and studied for power law occurrences. Since this
extended model had to be completely implemented, it can (together with the original
model) be seen as a herein missing extensive example of agent based modeling.
2.3. Axtell's model
The underlying model subject to an extension proposed by our article in the section
3. is the one presented by Robert Axtell in [4]. It is a microeconomic approach able
to yield empirically observed power law in company sizes distribution17. Despite the
fact that it makes use of the production function, increasing returns on micro level,
utility maximization or individual preferences, it \does not stand on equal footing
with any of the conventional theories of the ¯rm" { a ¯rm is physically understood
as a group of individuals and does not maximize its pro¯t, there are no transaction
costs or specialization. Moreover, it is an agent-based model facilitating bounded
rationality, individual heterogeneity, local interactions and most importantly, non-
equilibrium dynamics, a property widely present in the examined reality, but rarely
in the theory. Since this very model forms the article's basis, allow now its detailed
description18.
An agent is meant to be an individual. Let A be the set of all agents. Agents
know few other agents. Let v be the count of known agents 8i 2 A. Each agent
out of A either forms a standalone company or joins a company of one of its kins.
The decision is based on the highest utility given by the possible companies' output
shares. The output of any company Cj is de¯ned by the production function in the
form of
O(Ej) = aEj + bE
¯
j
where Ej is the sum of the e®orts ei of the member agents put in it, Ej =
P
i2Cj ei.
Parameters a, b and ¯ are general for further analysis, with b > 0 ^ ¯ > 1 for
increasing returns to production. All the agents belonging to a company Cj get
equal shares of
O(E)
jCjj , which are then converted to their utilities19. Utility function









17It also yields observed Laplace distribution of company growth rates, whose standard deviation
follows logarithmically a power law too. Axtell argues that there does not exist an equilibrium
microeconomic model explaining the causes; statistical solutions are however present (Gibrat's
law).
18Axtell's notation with small amendments has been preserved.
19Companis sets' volumes and members change over time, term Cj is used just to indicate that
there might be (and usually are) plenty of companies.with N = jCjj being the count of agents in the company Cj 3 i and µi 2 [0;1]
meaning the agent's preference for wage (¯rst bracket's term) over leisure (second
term). Agents may have di®erent preferences. Agents do not know the e®orts or
preferences of their colleagues. All they know is their count and their total remainder
e®ort Ej;»i (which can in fact be derived from ei and O(Ej) of Cj).
Axtell shows mathematically that the model is dynamically unstable and conse-
quently the presented ACE model proves it too. The simulation works as follows:
Initially, 1000 agents forming 1000 di®erent singleton companies are created. Then
a loop of single periods is executed. In each period, some agents are woken up
(each one with uniform probability). According to its µi, each selected agent then
computes possible utilities of staying in the company, forming a new company or
joining some of (to him) known companies and chooses the best option of his future
company and e®ort level. Only after all the selected agents have decided, changes
are made { outputs, shares and new remainder e®ort levels are calculated and the
next period starts. Program continuously gathers data for various statistics to be
calculated after the termination.
Agents' bounded rationality and autonomy is hidden in not seeing all the com-
panies, not knowing other agents' decisions and calculating with only aggregate
remainder e®ort levels of the previous period. Parameter µi values are the source
of heterogeneity, since they are uniformly distributed and do not change. Axtell
demonstrates that local decisions and movements among the ¯rms yield power law
distributions of company sizes and it does not even matter how the size is de¯ned {
power law exponent ® in (2) has a value of 2:28 when by number of member agents
and 1:88 if by total output ([4], 40).
The power law is not the only remarkable result. Axtell presents a typical life
cycle of a company in the simulation. Thanks to increasing returns to production
on micro level, joining other companies in the beginnings pays out. As a ¯rm grows
larger, problem of free riding takes place. Utility gained from the equal share of
agents becomes less sensitive to one's e®ort level changes. Growth declines, occa-
sionally even collapses and the ¯rm shrinks. Free riding limits a rampant expansion
and causes near constant returns to production at the aggregate level ([4], 43).
The author subsequently investigates the model parameterization. Values of b, ¯,
v, agents A count are separately altered. Distribution of µi and the utility functions
are modi¯ed, new aspects of loyalty, hiring standards and alternative compensations
schemes are introduced. Yielded properties, including the power law of company
sizes are robust to the modi¯cations, slope ® changes to various extents. Only the
change to entirely random decisions of agents impeded the distribution to arise.
All in all, an extensive work was done by Robert Axtell. What was left for future
investigations is that in the existing model \shirking goes completely undetected
and unpunished" ([4], 81). There is a potential of improving the output, since "if
economic organization meters poorly, productivity will be poor" ([1]). An extension
to the Axtell's model, where monitoring of agents by companies is considered, is
suggested in the next section.3. Model with monitoring
"Clues to each input's productivity can be secured by observing behavior
of individual inputs." - A.A. Alchian, H. Demsetz ([1])
Despite already having introduced power law distributions and agent-based eco-
nomic modeling, the main goal of the article is to present a complete and to certain
extent unique ACE model. The model suggested herein emanates from the Axtell's
model while it adds new features of monitoring of agents absent in the original.
Even two di®erent approaches of limiting the free riding problem are proposed and
implemented { demandingness and least e®ort out. Both make use of a boss notion,
which means that the boss { head of each company able to dismiss detected shirking
agents is unambiguously de¯ned.
In the following section, detailed description of the two approaches is given (3.1.).
Since the interpretation of results in ACE modeling lies within the simulation logic
itself, a more technical section 3.2. deals with the simulation implementation issues.
The results obtained are subsequently compared to the ones of Axtell's (chapter 4.1.)
and subject to simple modi¯cations (4.2.). A fully operating application capable of
running under di®erent input conditions in one of three possible modes (axtell,
demandingness and least e®ort out) used for result analysis shown later can be
obtained by the request from the author.
3.1. Boss monitoring method principles
In order to explain both methods, the notion of boss needs to be explained. Among
all the agents in a company Cj, a boss is the one, who is in the company for the
longest time. In the beginnings, it surely is the founder, nevertheless as time passes
and woken agents join other companies, it does not have to be him, therefore the
oldest member is always said to be the boss.
In both presented boss-monitoring approaches, the boss has the means to dismiss
shirking member agents. If he is in his mother company for su±ciently long time,
he can watch the other agents (who are members for su±cient number of periods
too) working and thus estimate their individual e®ort levels put in the company
according to their past performances. To implement such ability, recent periods'
average e®ort levels of the members are visible to him. Based on their values, he
can then decide of dismissals. A new parameter m de¯ning the number of periods
required to be in the company to monitor the average e®ort levels20, but also to be
monitored is added. Not only that the boss has to be in for m periods, but also
the observed members21. Said explicitly, for each period t, company Cj and agent
i 2 A, let observed average e®ort level be ¹ e
(t)





i , where e
(k)
i is the
e®ort level of the agent i in the period k. Let ¹ e
(t)
i (j) be unde¯ned if not all the m
past periods were spent in the current company Cj. Value of the average is only
visible to the boss and only if he has been a member for the last m periods.
20The boss member does not have to be a boss for m periods, all he has to be is a boss in actual
period and to be a member for su±cient time. Such behavior seems to be in step with reality.
21Short-term members are left unnoticeable for couple of periods.The de¯nitions of boss and observed average e®ort levels are equal in both vari-
ations. A distinctive aspect is the way in which bosses dismiss member agents:
² In the simpler demandingness approach, each agent, including bosses has
another parameter de¯ned - the demandingness level di 2 [0;1] assigned
randomly at the start of each simulation. In the existing implementation
values can be drawn from either uniform or truncated normal distribution
N(0:5;0:52). Each time a boss agent n of a company Cj is woken up in a
period t, he looks at all the visible member agents' average e®ort levels of the
past m periods and dismisses those, who have been recently giving less than
his actual e®ort multiplied by his demandingness { i.e. where ¹ e
(t)
i (j) < e
(t)
n ¢dn.
The method may be understood as if boss agents had some personal and time
shifting lower limits on the others' e®orts, which nobody would be allowed to
evade.
² In the least e®ort out approach, dismissals decisions will be based on possible
increase of the utility level of a boss. When a boss agent n of a company Cj
is woken up in a period t, he calculates his expected utility level ^ Un without
monitored average e®ort level of members, however with the current amount
of his e®ort level. He proceeds from the least diligent agents to the hardest
workers. Each time the expected utility without agent's i 2 Cj e®ort level
increases, he decides to dismiss the agent. The ¯rst comparison (decision about
the member with the least average e®ort level) is with the current boss's utility
level and the following ones iteratively with the expected utilities without
previously already dismissed agents. Said precisely, he decides to dismiss a






























j ), i(k) is the member with
the kth least average e®ort level and N
(t)
j the current size. The boss stops
dismissing as soon as the utility without some agent does not increase. Since
examined members are ordered by average e®ort levels, he would not ¯nd any
other free rider. Note that e®ort levels of bosses are not optimized to the
changes in remainder e®ort levels since the current values are applied.
The least e®ort out dismissal method is just a calculation, whether a boss
would be better of without paying wages to the least active members even
without having their average e®orts, all other conditions stayed unchanged. If
there are some free riders detected this way, there is no reason to keep them.
A woken boss looks at the averages only if he has been in the company for m
years and he would never ¯re himself; therefore he ignores himself in the calculations.
For sake of correctness of parallel decisions, boss calculations are done before agents
(and bosses) decisions of next period's place of employment. Since not all the
dismissed agents have to decide in the period of their dismissal, unemployed agentsarise, nevertheless that is changed as soon as such agents are woken up in following
periods.
If number of neighbors were low, it would however be very likely that they
would join the same companies when woken up. In order to prevent this happening,
a concept of banned lists is suggested { a company simply bans such agents to join
again. As companies' dismissal politics depend on their bosses, who can be replaced,
a ban lists is cleared whenever the company gets a new boss.
It is questionable if such extensions are conformable with reality. Especially the
existence of demandingness of bosses could be attacked, since evaluating the past
e®ort levels takes place in certain companies, e.g. in a way of monitoring the past
performances and outcomes of employees according to their charged hours. Perhaps
in smaller companies, there may exist an aspect such as demands of the founders on
newcomers.
The methods presented herein could be distantly seen as simplest implementa-
tions of free riders metering remarked by Alchian and Demsetz ([1]), moving Axtell's
model "in a useful and realistic direction" ([11]). Adding a monitoring might a®ect
¯rms' sizes and persistences, especially of the bigger ones, and is studied later (chap-
ter 4.). Yet, it does not take into account any (certainly existing) monitoring costs,
or the fact that the one to monitor { the boss, who has the power of dismissal, can
not encourage or threaten agents in order to make them perform faithfully. More
sophisticated models might be considered, such as monitoring by \reciprocators" {
employees willing to monitor shirkers for some residual claim, when bene¯ts out-
weigh costs by Bowles et al. ([8]), etc. One should however be aware of the fact,
that \all ¯rms su®er, to a greater or lesser extent, from imperfect monitoring, and
therefore the creation of economic models in which perfect monitoring obtains in
equilibrium is a kind of quixotic undertaking, for which the only possible outcome
can be disagreement with empirical data" ([4], 82).
The aim of this work is not to perfectly re°ect monitoring concepts, but to intro-
duce and implement a relatively simple initial agent-based model not very distant
from reality, for which the outcomes might be easily analyzed. And on which possi-
ble future improvements considering the aspects closer to metering free riders reality
might stand on.
3.2. Implementation notes
Similarly as in the approaches introduced, Axtell's paper in°uenced the very ap-
plication of this work too. Nevertheless, it has been fully written from scratch
and contains several amendments and modi¯cations. Its underlying requirements,
challenged brie°y herein from programming point of view, were as follows:
² Despite being inspired, the application had to re°ect new needs of the ap-
proaches of demandingness and least e®ort out.
² For giving a tool to compare all the methodologies with the original, it had to
be capable of being executed in three di®erent modes, where so-called \axtell"
mode had to copy the originally presented program °ow as much as possible.
This way, simulations' outcomes under any admissible set of input parametersmight be trusted in terms of comparing ability. Furthermore, results would
not have to rely on Axtell's data gained by OLS and more reliable method
(for power law estimations) of MLE of ® and goodness-of-¯t tests might be
applied for all the models22.
² As many as possible input parameters to be modi¯able, so the outcomes might
be studied to various changes by anybody. Speci¯cally, number of agents,
periods, neighbors v and average e®ort levels periods m as well as waking up
probability, preferences (µi) and demandingness (di) distribution types, a and
b output function parameters were chosen to be arbitrarily adjustable by users.
² Leaving ¯ = 2 eliminated one dimension of possible modi¯cations, however
allowed the application to compute agents' optimal e®ort levels \precisely"23.
² Application's output statistics to be stored in a clear format suitable for further
analysis in any reasonable tool. When asked, it would print a human readable
step-by-step process of agents' and bosses' thoughts and decisions.
All the above-mentioned requirements were successfully ful¯lled in the applica-
tion implemented. The following paragraphs give few notes about the simulation
programming principles. Object-oriented language used is Java in version 5. Three
main classes are considered { classes for Agent, Company and Simulation object
instances24 which represent agents, companies in a simulation and the simulation
itself.
Agent instance contains information about the agent's personal µ, current e®ort
value and current company reference. It can compute Coub-Douglas utility and the
optimal e®ort level in any given company if the remainder e®ort and size is given.
Using the internal neighborhood25 agents lists, decision about the next periods'
mother companies are then calculated. Additional aspects for the extensions include
the variables for pass e®ort level values and count of periods in the current company
as well as a method called after dismissals to handle unemployment correctly.
Similarly, instances of Company hold references to the actual member Agent in-
stances and know who the bosses are. Using the members' variables, a company can
compute the total output and e®ort and can give information about the current size
and remainder for any agent. Main extended logic is hidden within two methods
returning actual lists of free riders according to the approaches' de¯nitions and will
be reviewed shortly. Finally, each company has a list of banned agents, which is
¯lled with agent references each time somebody is dismissed and cleared whenever
a boss leaves the company.
Agent-based model run °ow is determined within Simulation class. For illus-
tration purposes, algorithm 1 depicts its main method's skeleton. Logic is similar to
22See appendix A
23Not that it would consider exact values such as
p
2 instead of a rounded












would be applied. In the original Axtell's
model, optimal e®ort levels were detected by a \line search over feasible range of e®orts"([4], 26).
24There is also a class for input parameters representation, but that is irrelevant herein.
25Neighborhood does not have to necessarily be a symmetric relation.Algorithm 1 Simulation logic in pseudocode
read input parameters
period ( 1
initialize agents frandomizes their µ, d, neighbours as wellg
found agents' singleton companies
prepare statistical ¯les
while period < totalPeriodsCount do
period ( period + 1
wokenAgents ( wake randomly some agents
for all wokenAgents do
if wokenAgent was in his current company a boss in the last m periods then
freeRiders ( detect all free riders according to the current simulation mode
dismiss and ban all the agents in freeRiders
end if
end for
for all wokenAgents do
currentUtil ( compute expected optimal utility in the current company
neighbourUtil;neighbour ( compute highest expected optimal utility among the neighborhood companies
newCompanyUtil ( compute expected optimal utility for a newly founded company
decide to stay/join/found according to the highest among currentUtil, neighbourUtil, newCompanyUtil
values
end for
for all Agents do
¯nalize decisionfstores current company and e®ort levels variables, handles unemployed passive agents
correctlyg
end for
write period's period entries into aggregate companies and agents statistical ¯les
end while
generate ¯nal company sizes data
Axtell's, with free riders dismissal being processed prior to any new decision takes
place. If mode is set to \axtell", freeRiders set of agents returned is empty and
the simulation almost precisely emulates the original. Otherwise, the appropriate
free riders detection method of the boss current company is called. Note that when
deciding, new decisions are not ¯nalized immediately, but only after all the woken
agents have done so too. Such conduct is necessary for correct parallel execution to
avoid a®ecting the still not decided agents unpredictably.
Algorithm 2 Free riders detection in demandingness mode of a Company instance
bossEffort ( get current e®ort of this company's boss
bossDemandingness ( get demandingness level of this company's boss
acceptableThreshold ( bossEffort ¤ bossDemandingness
freeRiders ( empty Agents list
for all memberAgents in this Company except the boss and those not members in the m last periods do
agentAvEffort ( get average e®ort of the agent
if agentAvEffort < acceptableThreshold then




Algorithms 2 and 3 explain how the free riders are detected. In the demanding-
ness mode, the boss of a company straightforwardly looks at its members¶ e®ort av-
erages and selects those agents, whose values are less than the acceptableThreshold.
Shirkers under the least e®ort out are found di®erently. Starting from the lowest
averages, utility of the boss without certain members, but with the current (and
possibly not optimal) boss¶s e®ort is calculated. Searching stops as soon as dis-
missing an agent would not make the boss better o®. In both methods, bosses andagents not in the ¯rm for su±cient time are ignored. Agents are ¯nally banned and
in the main Simulation method immediately dismissed. Those free riders, who are
among the woken agents, decide of their future in the same period shortly after,
whereas the others later.
Algorithm 3 Free riders detection in least e®ort out mode of a Company instance
utilityPossible ( get current utility of this company's boss
bossCurrEffort ( get current e®ort level of this company's boss
bossTheta ( get theta value of this company's boss
sumEffort ( get company's total e®ort level
size ( get company size
freeRiders ( empty Agents list
for all memberAgents upwardly sorted by average e®ort levels, excluding the boss and not members in the m
last periods do
agAvEffort ( get average e®ort of the agent
utilityWOAnother ( compute boss utility with bossCurrEffort, sumEffort ¡ agAvEffort, size ¡ 1,
bossTheta
if utilityWOAnother < utilityPossible then
utilityPossible ( utilityWOAnother
sumEffort ( sumEffort ¡ agentAvEffort
size ( size ¡ 1
add agent to the freeRiders list
else





After the introductory and explanatory parts, results may ¯nally be presented. At
¯rst, Axtell's set of parameters is applied to all the three modes (section 4.1.). The
new approaches outputs are correctly, although indirectly, compared to the original
through \axtell" mode, since maximum likelihood estimation of ® instead of ordinary
least squares was applied. Secondly, few parameters are subject to a modi¯cation
analysis (4.2.).
All the data used can be obtained by the request from the authors. For it is
an output of a program, it contains no measurement error or noise, what may be
slightly unusual. For exponent estimations, application was always run exactly one
hundred times with the same input parameters and the power law ¯t functions were
then applied on the aggregated ¯nal company sizes26. On the other hand, companies
and agents statistics (companies lifetimes, agent average e®ort levels, etc.) shown
are derived from single application runs only.
4.1. Initial parameters' results
Default parameter settings are summarized in the table 1. All the values are shared,
demandingness level distribution type takes place only in demandingness mode.
26Single run outputs vary because of the di®erences in randomly assigned µ values and the dif-
ferences in waking order. Aggregating unique ¯nal company sizes means aggregating independent
values and suppressing deviant behaviors too.parameter value
Number of agents, jAj 1000
Number of periods 2000
Output function parameters a and b 1.0, 1.0
Probability of waking up 0.2
Boss monitoring periods m 2
Number of neighbors v 2
Distribution of µ preferences uniform
(Distribution of demandingness levels d) normal
Table 1: Initial parameters settings
Having run the application with this set of parameters in each mode one hundred
times and aggregating the ¯nal company sizes, exponent ® was estimated using MLE
as 2:92 (Axtell), 3:23 (demandingness) and 3:28 (least e®ort out). Lower bound x0
was estimated to be 7, 6 and 5 respectively27. Figure 2 depicts the data gained
together with the best power law ¯ts graphically. It shows cumulative distribution
functions, therefore the right-hand ends are distorted less than in mass functions



















































































































Figure 2: Power law MLE ® and x0 estimates for Axtell (2:92, 7), demandingness
(3:23, 6) and leaste®ort out modes (3:28, 5) in default environment
Note that the ¯rst exponent (2:92) is di®erent to the one published by Robert
Axtell (2:28), what may have been caused by applying MLE instead of OLS, dif-
27Example of such estimations (concretely of 3:23) using the power law functions for Matlab and
R (available in [13]) is illustrated in the Appendix A.
28Cumulative power law distribution is similar to line in log-log scales too - see [25].ferent aggregation of the runs' outputs, random events, as well as the applications'
variances themselves. Yet, the Axtell mode results are comparable to the new ap-
proaches through using the same application in di®erent modes. For both of them,
exponents are estimated to be higher, even above 3 - 3:23 and 3:28. Since the new
methodologies generally adopt dismissing and banning the shirkers, this is not so
surprising. Higher ® means more small and less bigger companies operating on a
market, causing the line slope in log log scales to rise absolutely, which may be the
case. Around 101:8 : = 63, a drastic fall of the companies sizes CDF in both models



















































Figure 3: Single run statistics about agents in default environment
F ree riders dismissals and bans to rejoin seem to create barriers not possible to
be overstepped. Larger companies are extinct and work as "exclusive clubs". Such
behavior is strengthened by a further data analysis. Figures 3 and 4 show single
run statistics of agents and companies 29. E®ect of boss monitoring introduction
looks alike for both new approaches, since all the graphs in the second and third
columns are almost identical. Companies count always stabilizes at around 400 and
the average size at around 2.5, even though ways there are di®erent to the Axtell's
(¯gure 4). Company average lifetimes are higher for the new approaches, what is
clearly caused by unlimited maximum lifetime (probably of the biggest company;
notice the constantly linear increases in the second row of 4), contrast to the oldest
company changes in the original version. In addition, maximum company sizes do
not °uctuate that rapidly30 and stabilize around 40 (it °uctuates around 40 in the
¯rst mode too). Average values do not di®er even for agents statistics (see 3),
whereas maximal agent utilities do. The value is from a certain point constant,
meaning that the highest utility agent's ¯rm (very likely the maximum sized one)
found its optimal employment structure. It does not let in anyone else and works
as an \exclusive club". Banned agents are left to work in the remainder space.
Although estimating higher exponents in the e®ort levels monitoring approaches
may sound logical, limiting the total dynamics is not a desirable feature. One way
to relieve seen strong constraints could be in changing the monitoring e®ort level
methodology, e.g. considering a completely di®erent approach or at least allowing
bosses to forget about banned agents after a certain number of periods. Another way
is to change the underlying parameters. Having only 2 neighbors in the environment
of dismissals and banning may be too harsh, since for some agents, being dismissed
twice is relatively easy. If such pairs of neighborhood companies stabilize in time
29Tenth out of one hundred runs was selected in all three cases.










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Single run statistics about companies in default environment
{ meaning that their bosses would not want to leave them, it is impossible for the
dismissed agents to join any company. Allowing to have more neighbors may then
help and so may an alternation of another parameters.
4.2. Parameters adjustments analysis
Modifying various parameters may or may not have a signi¯cant impact on the
model dynamics and therefore the output. This section deals speci¯cally with the
values of neighbors count v, average e®ort levels calculation periods count m and d
demandingness levels and µ values distribution types31 adjustments.
Exponents of all the variations were once again calculated using MLE applied on
one hundred independent runs aggregates. Lower bound is always selected to be the
value, from which the estimated power law distribution ¯ts generated data the best in
terms of Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance. P-values estimates of Kolmogorov-Smirnov
goodness-of-¯t tests are in the outline tables presented as well32. For comparison,
31In the existing version of the software, truncated normal and uniform distributions on [0;1]
are selectable.
32See Appendix A.initial parameter results from the previous section are in the greyed rows.
Axtell Demandingness Least e®ort out
m ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ®
3 2:92 7 0 2:42 3:23 6 0:049 2:54 3:28 5 0 2:70
4 3:39 15 0:172 2:59 3:13 9 0:457 2:40 3:06 6 0:045 2:53
5 3:17 12 0:177 2:49 2:81 5 0 2:92 2:47 6 0:022 2:52
6 3:31 14 0:36 2:44 3:5 18 0:396 3:04 2:52 9 0:042 2:41
Table 2: Monitored periods count adjustments
Table 2 summarizes the results gained when changing the m parameter. Note
that the exponents are not always higher for the Axtell's mode, and that they de-
crease in general for the new approaches with higher m. From the ¯rst column,
it is clear, that the values vary among estimations all other conditions stayed un-
changed even when aggregating one hundred di®erent runs. Parameter m does not
a®ect the logic of the simulation in the Axtell's mode, therefore the ¯rst column
represents four equivalent simulations, although all leading to di®erent estimations.
One can consider it an error, nevertheless the estimations of x0 vary much as well.
Data sets are sensitive enough in terms of that even a small shift in few values can
cause a better resemblance to power law from higher lower bounds, which causes the
increases of ®33. That is the root of comparing di±culties when x0 di®er a lot. De-
spite not guaranteeing normalization, unbiasedness and not meeting the theoretical
requirements ([12]), OLS comes herein handy, therefore the ordinary least squares
estimations were calculated too34. Roughly sad, the estimates are not very sensitive
to the changes of m for the ¯rst mode, slightly more for the other two. In addition,
the ¯rst column values are closer to Axtell's 2:28 now, while the "better" MLE ®
di®er signi¯cantly. That only underlines the need for careful applications, especially
of the OLS estimator often used incontinently.
Axtell Demandingness Least e®ort out
d ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ®
normal 2:92 7 0 2:42 3:23 6 0:049 2:54 3:28 5 0 2:70
uniform - - - - 3:17 6 0:192 2:50 - - - -
Table 3: Demandingness levels distribution adjustments
Axtell Demandingness Least e®ort out
µ ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ®
uniform 2:92 7 0 2:42 3:23 6 0:049 2:54 3:28 5 0 2:70
normal 3:5 7 0 3:18 3:5 6 0 2:74 3:5 5 0 3:39
Table 4: Preferences distribution adjustments
As seen from the table 3, a change in demandingness levels distribution type
from normal to truncated uniform does not have any in°uence to the outputs. On
33For instance, on the pictures 3 or 6 even a small shift of x0 means higher ®.
34OLS was applied on all the logarithmic sizes and frequencies and therefore does always assume
lower bound to be x0 = 1.the other hand, modifying the distribution of preferences expressed by µ values to
truncated normal instead of uniform increases the exponents and not only when
applying OLS, but even MLE (table 4; x0 estimates stayed unchanged). A lower
number of \extreme" and a higher count of \average" agents (with µ around 0:5)
has a positive absolute impact on the slope.
Axtell Demandingness Least e®ort out
v ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ® ® x0 p-value OLS ®
2 2:92 7 0 2:42 3:23 6 0:049 2:54 3:28 5 0 2:70
3 2:49 7 0 2:10 2:59 7 0 2:21 2:35 4 0 2:34
4 2:55 14 0 1:98 2:48 9 0 2:02 2:54 10 0 2:18
5 3:24 67 0:14 1:76 2:66 14 0 2:00 3:5 31 0 2:13
6 3:06 56 0:05 1:75 3:5 67 0:43 1:91 3:5 35 0 2:03
7 3:32 80 0:35 1:63 3:5 43 0:18 1:90 3:5 36 0:12 1:91



















































































































Figure 5: Power law MLE ® and x0 estimates for Axtell (3:06, 56), demandingness
(3:5, 67) and leaste®ort out modes (3:5, 35) in six neighbours environment
The most promising parameter to be analyzed is the neighbors count summarized
in the table 5. Where x0 estimate stayed small (the ¯rst three rows of the table),
® decreased with increased neighbors count bringing in more joining possibilities
for agents. It is once again tricky to compare it with the remaining estimates,
where lower bounds raised rapidly causing exponents to jump up. Having minimum
company size for power law ¯t well above 50 within 1000 agents' environments
undermines any estimation result, since it speaks only about a fragment of data set,even though it might be the best ¯t. Nonetheless, ® OLS approximations there also
imply substantial decreases of exponents with neighbor counts increases as it was
already predicted in the previous section. Figure 5 demonstrates the reason of OLS
and MLE with lower bound selection di®erences. While latter considers only the
best right-hand part of the graph, former uses all the values for linear ¯t causing



















































Figure 6: Single run statistics about agents in six neighbors environment
Relaxing the tight constraint of having only two neighbors creates a wider possi-
bilities space. A dismissed and banned agent may still have a chance to join another
company . It is questionable then, whether blocking all the new possibilities might be
only a matter of time or if the possibilities' relief results also in a greater dynamics
in bosses' career movements outweighing the blockages. The ¯gures 6 and 7 depict
the same set of agents and companies statistics for all the three methodologies as
in the ¯gures 3 and 4. Once again, the tenth simulation runs of six neighbors were
selected. Interestingly , company average sizes ampli¯ed everywhere causing compa-
nies counts fell down proportionally . Maximum ¯rm sizes show no stagnation for
demandingness and least e®ort out approaches anymore. The biggest companies
are opened to new employees. W ould that prevail even in a longer run? Note that
maximum lifetime varies now for demandingness too, while for least e®ort out it
does not. If more graphs with number of neighbours greater than 2 were plotted, it
would not be uncommon to see some mixture of such two behaviors. Dynamics in
the beginnings occasionally turning into linear segments in the ends, meaning that
an \exclusive" company has arisen 35, strengthened by the maximum agent utilities
graph (see the last two charts of the ¯gure 7). Unfortunately, all that one can say
is that with higher neighbors count dynamics improve36, however may be overcome
observing more periods.
4.3. Final remarks and future work
More than 3000 simulations were run in order to aggregately quantify exponents
and lower bounds of power law distribution ¯tting along with 11 di®erent sets of
parameters. Comparing solely the MLE ® values is problematic in the situations
where x0 is determined to be higher causing the upward shift of the corresponding
exponents. If we accept OLS outputs as being reliable (while still not forgetting their
35For the given least e®ort out example, \exclusive" company does not have to be the largest
company now, as maximum ¯rm size °uctuates a lot.





















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Single run statistics about companies in six neighbors environment
insu±ciency for power law ¯tting), then a decent reduction of ® can be observed
with higher number of neighbors relieving the tight constrains levied on agents in 2
neighbors mode. Adjusting the boss monitoring periods and demandingness levels
distribution types does not a®ect the estimations.
Tables and 2, 3, 4 and 5 contain values, which have been constantly ignored up to
this point { p-values of goodness-of-¯t tests. P-value \quanti¯es the probability that
generated data were drawn from the hypothesized power law distribution" ([12]).
Having selected a statistical signi¯cance level as for instance 5%, this hypothesis
can be rejected if corresponding p-value falls below it. In the presented results, it
unfortunately happens quite often. Only few MLE results have high p-values { for
instance in Axtell's approach with m = 4;5;6 or in demandingness with m = 4;6,
uniform d values and in few others cases. The highest p-value obtained is within
demandingness with six neighbors - 0:43, meaning that the null hypothesis of ¯tting
the power law with ® = 3:5 and x0 = 67 cannot be rejected at 5% signi¯cance
level. Second chart of the ¯gure 5 shows a nice ¯t there. Yet, two problems are still
persistent: not rejecting is not equal to accepting and ¯tting from 67 covers only a
fragment of data.
One can see such results rather unsatisfactory. It may be so, however the workonly con¯rmed Clauset's warning of relying solely on OLS ([12]). If this ¯tting
methodology had been used herein exclusively, results would have unambiguously
conformed the ones of Axtell. Applying the recommended MLE reveals the existing
problems in power law ¯tting procedures.
In the agent-based models, economic roots lie within the simulations' logics and
so it is in the model analyzed. Heterogeneous boundedly rational agents maximizing
their own utilities lead to company size distributions. Since the results depend on
indeterministic factors such as random µ assignment and waking order, it is only
the interaction rules that explain the results. In the model described, interactions
do not regularly bring in power law ¯rm sizes, when applying the proper estimation
methodology.
5. Conclusion
Agent-based computational modeling o®ers new ways of examining economic pat-
terns from the bottom-up perspective, where microeconomic interactions lead to an
aggregate dynamics. A scientist focuses in particular on correct de¯nition of agents'
behavior and programming languages o®er him unlimited spectrum of usable pos-
sibilities. Relatively recent economic notions of bounded rationality, individuals'
heterogeneity, etc. are often natural characteristics of an agent-based simulation,
whereas including these in traditional economic models is usually a hard nut to
crack.
In this article, an own agent-based computational model for company sizes dis-
tribution generation based on the ideas of Robert Axtell ([4]) was proposed and
even fully implemented. Motivation for examining this economic and statistical
pattern comes from numerous empirical studies, which have observed power law
distributions in real ¯rms' sizes. The idea behind the implemented model is to let
agents form various sized companies in search for utility maximization. As compa-
nies grow, free-riders problem arises. The article adds a notion of aggregate e®ort
levels detectability by bosses, who are given the right to dismiss the shirkers.
Simulation always generates a distribution, where it is much more likely to see
a small than a big company, however ¯t to a power law is irregular. Applying
correct statistical methodologies, only certain parameter settings led to power law,
attenuated by the sensitivity of indeterministic factors. Even running the simulation
one hundred times and then once again may result in di®erent exponents when lower
bounds are estimated too. Widely used OLS neglects these problems and since its
theoretical requirements are not met, it should be avoided. Nevertheless, if one
accepts it, then the results are similar to the ones of Axtell and others. Including
the monitoring, dynamics tightens and power law estimated exponents increase. As
predicted, relaxing default constraints of neighbor counts on the other hand supports
the dynamics. Both OLS and MLE (to certain extent) prove that exponents decrease
and a higher number of bigger companies is observable.
Future o®ers few paths in order to further study company sizes distribution using
agent-based modeling - either an improvement of proposed monitoring approaches or
building a new one. Dynamics enhancing features, such as banned agents' memory
continual clearing, bosses rotations or elections, more complex hierarchic structuresand di®erent methods of dismissals might be added. Interesting idea would be the
mutual monitoring by \reciprocators" of Bowles et el. ([8]) and considering the
monitoring costs.
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For reliable analysis of data generated by the application, methods presented by
Clauset, Shalizi and Newman in [12] were used. The authors proved that well-
founded methods, such as least squares ¯tting, produce biased estimates and what
is even worse, they can not be trusted in power law presence conclusions drawn.
Their method makes use of:
² Maximum likelihood estimation of ® from a dataset given37.
² Estimating the lower bound x0 by selecting the value from which on the prob-
ability distribution of generated data and the best ¯tting power law MLE
estimation is the closest possible measured by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.
² Assessing if the data following the estimated power law distribution hypothesis
can not be rejected by means of Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-¯t test38.
For the details, see their excellent paper [25]. The authors implemented R and
Matlab functions for estimations following the methodology39, which came very
useful for this work as well. Example power law estimations using their functions on
the aggregated ¯nal data of demandingness mode under the default set of parameters
(chapter 4.1.) is given in the listings 1 and 2.
>> company_sizes_raw_combined = csvread('company_sizes_raw_combined.csv');
>> [alpha , xmin, D] = plfit(company_sizes_raw_combined);
>> [alpha , xmin, D]
ans =
3.2300 6.0000 0.0138

























38They present even a method of deciding whether the data were not drawn from competing
distributions, e.g. lognormal or exponential.
39See Aaron Clauset webpage at http://www.santafe.edu/~aaronc/powerlaws/.[1] 3.23
$D
[1] 0.01376551
Listing 2: R power law estimation procedure example
Exponent of ® = 3:23, lower bound of x0 = 6 were estimated. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance to the ¯tted power law is 0:01376551 and p-value of the corre-
sponding goodness-of-¯t test is 0:0490 meaning that the power law hypothesis can
be rejected even on the signi¯cance level of 5%. 
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